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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 February 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 133

SUBJECT: Reassessment of certain Assumptions contained in [REDACTED]

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1. With regard to the assumption in paragraph 8, the basic situation on the Palestine issue has not changed during the past few months. The Rhodes Conference and the possibility of further negotiations between Israel and the Arab states merely represent a normal swing of the pendulum after the violent hostilities of the last two weeks in December and are not likely to lead to a definitive settlement of the whole question. Nor is there any indication that there will soon be an abatement of political turmoil in the Arab states; on the contrary, their internal difficulties are becoming intensified as a result of financial burdens, economic dislocations, and ultra-nationalist dissatisfaction over the Palestine debacle. However, the wave of antagonism against the US and the UK, felt by the Arabs as a result of the developments in Palestine during 1948, is being gradually replaced by a feeling of bitter resignation. Many influential Arab leaders are beginning to believe that the Palestine issue must be subordinated to the more vital issue of Arab survival, which they feel depends on realistic cooperation with the Western Powers. These leaders, however, will probably be unable effectively to act on this belief until the attitude of resignation over the Palestine issue has become general among the Arab peoples. This is unlikely until some sort of modus vivendi between Israel and the Arab states is achieved, and a modicum of stability is reestablished in the Arab states.

In view of this analysis, it is felt that the assumption might be modified to read as follows:

"The Arab states deeply distrust the USSR and, if they were unable to remain neutral, would prefer to support the Anglo-American powers, in spite of great disillusionment over US and UK policy toward Palestine. However, because political turmoil in the Arab states

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will probably continue, the Arab governments, although unlikely to oppose the use by Western Powers of territories and resources in Arab control, will be unable (even though willing) to afford them any significant cooperation, at least initially. Israel, although unlikely to offer effective opposition to the Western Powers, would be reluctant to afford them any cooperation."

2. The assumption as stated in paragraph 9 is considered valid for India and Pakistan during 1949. Moreover, it might be mentioned that within the past several months the GOI has shown an increasing orientation toward the West; this, if the trend continues, would permit a more optimistic evaluation for years subsequent to 1949. A reversal of this trend could easily occur, however, if the Indians should become disillusioned because of: (1) developments in Indonesia; (2) failure of the Indian effort to procure technical and financial assistance now being sought from the West; or (3) bitterness if, in the event of an increasingly critical food situation, grain from Western countries should not be forthcoming.

Pakistan, with what is believed to be a natural predilection toward the West, and jealous of such favors as more powerful India might obtain from the West, can be expected to retain a position no less friendly than that of India.

3. With regard to the assumption in paragraph 3, it is estimated that in the event of war in 1949, Yugoslavia's objective will be to avoid active participation, and especially to forestall occupation by Soviet troops.

Yugoslavia will attempt to attain these objectives, probably by professing neutrality, possibly by professing adherence to the USSR. A profession of neutrality would probably be accompanied by sub-rosa assistance to the USSR.

In either case Yugoslavia will resist general occupation by Soviet troops, but might permit the passage of Soviet troops across Yugoslavia.

Whenever Yugoslavia becomes sufficiently important strategically to the USSR the latter will overrun and occupy it.

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